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Defining Myanmar’s “Rohingya Problem”
by Benjamin Zawacki*
Much has been written either empathetically or as a challenge of Myanmar’s “Rohingya problem.” Between June and November 2012, the Rohingya 
bore the brunt of communal violence, human rights violations, 
and an urgent humanitarian situation in Rakhine State, and still 
face an uncertain future.
A great deal of rhetoric has attended 
these accounts—by officials and citizens 
of Myanmar, Rohingya organizations, 
journalists, human rights groups, and 
others—essentially attaching labels to 
the situation. And while there have been 
a number of thoughtful attempts to define 
or even explain the Rohingya problem in 
historical or political terms, they have 
been largely drowned out by emotive 
outbursts and media-friendly sound bites. 
This is not only unfortunate, it is also consequential, for as was 
seen in 2012, rhetoric can influence both the way in which a 
crisis plays out as well as in how it is responded to. In other 
words, how we talk about what it is we are talking about matters. 
What do we mean when we talk about the “Rohingya problem”?
In proffering a modest definition of Myanmar’s “Rohingya 
problem”—one almost entirely of its own making—three 
distinct but related areas of law and fact warrant particular 
examination: 1) nationality and discrimination, which focuses 
exclusively on Myanmar; 2) statelessness and displacement, 
which implicates Myanmar’s neighbors as well; and 3) the 
doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect, which draws into the 
discussion the role of the international community.
These three areas demonstrate that although the root causes 
of the “Rohingya problem” are within Myanmar, their effects are 
felt regionally and are of relevance even further afield. They are 
thus progressively causal, and they imply where efforts toward 
solutions should be directed and prioritized.
NatioNality aNd discrimiNatioN
The violent events of 2012, as well as those of 1978, 1992, 
2001, and 2009, can be attributed to systemic discrimination 
against the Rohingya in Myanmar. That is, to a political, social, 
and economic system—manifested in law, policy, and practice—
designed to discriminate against this ethnic and religious minor-
ity. This system makes such direct violence against the Rohingya 
far more possible and likely than it would be otherwise. Further, 
in the eyes of the Myanmar authorities at least—as evidenced 
by the lack of legal accountability for civilians and officials 
alike—discrimination also makes the violence and violations 
somehow justifiable. This is the Rohingya problem boiled down 
to its most basic element.
In 1978’s “Dragon King” operation, 
the Myanmar army committed widespread 
killings and rapes of Rohingya civilians, 
and they carried out the destruction of 
mosques and other religious persecution. 
These events resulted in the exodus of an 
estimated 200,000 Rohingya to neigh-
boring Bangladesh. Another campaign 
of forced labor, summary executions, 
torture, and rape in 1992 led to a similar 
number of Rohingyas fleeing across the 
border. In February 2001, communal 
violence between the Muslim and Buddhist populations in 
Sittwe resulted in an unknown number of people killed and 
Muslim property destroyed.1 In late 2008 and early 2009, 
Thai authorities pushed back onto the high seas several 
boats—lacking adequate food, water, and fuel—of Rohingyas 
in the Andaman Sea.2
All of these events have similar, separate equivalents in 
countries in which systemic discrimination does not take place. 
Yet in Myanmar such discrimination provides the violence 
with a ready-made antecedent, expressly approved by the state. 
Indeed to varying degrees, the seminal events noted above 
were simply exacerbations of this underlying discrimination: 
alarming episodic symptoms of a chronic legal, political, and 
economic illness. It would overstate the causality to assert that if 
Myanmar had never put its system of discrimination against the 
Rohingya into place, then these events would not have occurred. 
Eliminating it now, however, is urgently required for a future 
of sustainable peace in Rakhine State. Equally important, it is 
imperative under human rights law.
The system’s anchor is the 1982 Citizenship Law, which in 
both design and implementation effectively denies the right to a 
nationality to the Rohingya population. It supersedes all previous 
citizenship regimes in Myanmar.3 The 1982 Citizenship Law 
creates three classes of citizens—full, associate, and naturalized 
—none of which has been conferred on most Rohingyas.
Myanmar reserves full citizenship for those whose ancestors 
settled in the country before the year 1823 or who are members 
of one of Myanmar’s more than 130 recognized national ethnic 
groups, which do not include the Rohingya. Associate citizens 
are those who both are eligible and have applied for citizenship 
under a previous 1948 law. This requires an awareness of the law 
that few Rohingya posses and a level of proof that even fewer 
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are able to provide. Access to naturalized citizenship is similarly, 
available only for those who resided in Myanmar on or before 
1948. With all three classes, the Central Body has the discretion 
to deny citizenship even when the criteria are met.4
The 1982 Citizenship Law’s discriminatory effects are also 
extremely consequential. The main effect is that the Rohingya, 
most of whom lack citizenship in Myanmar, have been rendered 
stateless, both unable to avail themselves of the protection of the 
state and—as has been the case for decades—subject to policies 
and practices that constitute violations of their human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. These include restrictions on movement; 
forced labor; land confiscation, forced eviction, and destruction 
of houses; extortion and arbitrary taxation; and restrictions on 
marriage, employment, health care, and education.5 Although 
not limited to Rohingyas, these restrictions are not imposed 
in the same manner and to the same degree on Buddhists or 
other Muslims in Rakhine State, or on other 
ethnic minorities across the country.
This is systemic discrimination: laws, 
policies, and practices, though designed 
and carried out by people, are ultimately 
part of or attributable to a system that 
ensures discrimination even in the absence 
of discriminatory individuals.
It is unlawful. As a member of the 
United Nations, Myanmar is legally obliged 
to promote “universal respect for, and obser-
vance of, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms for all without distinction as to 
race, sex, language, or religion,” as declared 
in Articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights—though not 
a binding document—provides in Article 15 that “everyone 
has the right to a nationality.” Article 2 holds that everyone is 
entitled to all the rights in the Declaration “without distinction 
of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political 
or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or 
other status.” So significant is this anti-discrimination language 
that it can be found in five more international human rights 
documents, including the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC)6 and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).7
Myanmar has ratified both of these documents, making 
their provisions binding on the state. According to Amnesty 
International, it is a violation “to be deprived of one’s rights 
because of a characteristic that one cannot change—such as 
one’s race or ethnic origin—or because of a characteristic that is 
so central to one’s being that one should not be forced to change 
it, such as religion.”8
In addition, Article 7 of the CRC provides for the right of 
a child to a nationality, “in particular where the child would 
otherwise be stateless.” It is clear that Myanmar, as a State Party 
to this treaty, is in violation of its international legal obligations 
pertaining to the right of Rohingya children to a nationality.
Myanmar should substantially amend the 1982 Citizenship 
Law or repeal and redraft it, such that the Rohingya are 
indisputably made citizens. Rohingyas born in Myanmar who 
would otherwise be stateless should be granted citizenship, as 
should those who are not born there but are able to establish a 
genuine and effective link to the country. Myanmar should also 
eliminate its policies and practices that discriminate against the 
Rohingya on the grounds of ethnicity and/or religion.
More than any other single step, dismantling its system 
of discrimination would bring Myanmar’s Rohingya problem 
closer to a solution.
StateleSSneSS and diSplacement
Because Myanmar’s Rohingyas have been deprived of a 
nationality, they are rendered stateless. The human rights effects 
of this both for Rohingyas inside Myanmar and those living 
abroad as refugees are substantial.
Inside Myanmar, a kind of circularity 
exists whereby systemic discrimination 
renders the Rohingya stateless, while their 
status as a stateless population acts as 
validation for further discrimination and 
persecution by the state and its citizens. 
Because of this, access to a nationality is 
commonly known as “the right to have 
rights.”9 This description, however, is only 
correct in fact but not as a matter of law; 
all human rights belonging to citizens also 
belong to stateless persons.
Immigration law may legitimately 
distinguish between those with and those 
without a nationality. But just as states’ 
authority to confer nationality is restrained 
by a prohibition on denial based on ethnicity or religion, they 
likewise cannot apply immigration law at the expense of basic 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. Similarly, although 
human rights law allows for the conditional suspension of 
certain rights during emergencies, it does not permit—as was 
the case during the state of emergency declared in northern 
Rakhine State in June 201210—derogation from the right to life 
(among other rights).
There are two international treaties on statelessness, neither 
of which Myanmar has signed or ratified. At first glance, the 
Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons would 
seem to be the more relevant to the Rohingya, for it pertains 
to the treatment of de jure stateless persons. A de jure stateless 
person is one “who is not considered as a national by any state 
under the operation of its law.”11 Both its Preamble and Article 
3 contain non-discrimination clauses, while other provisions 
provide protections in respect to religion, property, employment, 
education, public assistance, and social security,12 all implicating 
the situation of the Rohingyas in Myanmar.
Yet, it is far from clear that the Convention would even apply 
to the Rohingya in Myanmar, as it applies only to stateless 
persons deemed to be legally residing in the country at issue. 
Applicability would thus turn on whether, by virtue of the 1982 
Citizenship Law, the Rohingya are deemed by Myanmar not to 
be legally residing in its territory, or whether other actions by 
the authorities since 1982 indicate or confer legal residency.13
[L]aws, policies, 
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Rohingya were permitted in 1990 to form political parties 
and vote in multiparty elections. Myanmar accepted some 
250,000 repatriated Rohingya refugees from Bangladesh in 
1992 and in 1994 began issuing Temporary Resident Cards to 
some of them (although the country also ceased issuing birth 
certificates to Rohingya babies the same year). Rohingyas were 
permitted to vote in both the 2008 Constitutional referendum 
and the 2010 national elections, for which they were also 
granted a form of temporary identification card. As Myanmar 
does for all residents, the authorities have maintained lists 
of Rohingya families for several decades.
If the 1982 Citizenship Law renders the Rohingya illegal 
residents, then the Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless 
Persons reflects and actually contributes to the circularity in 
Myanmar described above. It effectively “scores an own goal” 
by allowing states—through the very discrimination it was 
designed to contest—to opt out of adhering to its provisions. 
If the authorities do consider the Rohingya as legally residing 
in Myanmar, however, then the Convention would apply, and 
Myanmar should be urged to ratify and implement it.14
The Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, in 
contrast, is of indisputable relevance to Myanmar’s Rohingyas, 
as it obligates States Parties to prevent, reduce, and avoid state-
lessness through taking certain positive measures, especially by 
granting “its nationality to a person born in its territory who 
would otherwise be stateless.”15 This Convention should thus 
be the focus of increased advocacy as a solution to the problem.
At least hundreds of thousands of Rohingyas have been 
physically displaced over the past 25 years, both internally and 
outside of Myanmar. Although hardly an exhaustive list, the five 
seminal events noted above, in 1978, 1992, 2001, 2009, and 
2012, all featured or resulted in such displacement. Internally, 
not only has communal violence displaced Rohingyas, but state 
policy, practice, and participation—including in either instigat-
ing or failing to stop communal violence—have accounted 
for internal displacement as well. At least 115,000 Rohingyas 
are still in camps away from their homes in the wake of last 
year’s clashes.16 State authorities have forcibly or arbitrarily 
transferred Rohingyas over the years through militarization 
of northern Rakhine State, land confiscation, evictions from 
homes and homesteads, and the construction of model villages.17
The UN Guiding Principles on Internally Displaced Persons, 
with its focus on rights and non-discrimination, should form the 
basis of the Myanmar government’s treatment of these internally 
displaced Rohingyas, but clearly this has not been the case. 
Although non-binding, the Principles contemplate all those 
internally displaced, including stateless persons.
It is believed that more Rohingya live outside Myanmar than 
the estimated 800,000 who live inside the country,18 creating 
an involuntary diaspora through two and a half decades of 
both overt forced deportation and removal by state authorities, 
as well as the communal violence state policy has facilitated. 
These people are not simply refugees—a difficult enough 
status to cope with—but stateless persons outside their territory 
of habitual and historical residence.
This status does not change the root causes of the Rohingya 
problem, but it does extend the focus beyond Myanmar alone 
and onto its immediate and regional neighbors. Saudi Arabia is 
thought to host 500,000 Rohingyas.19 In Bangladesh, the country 
that has and continues to host the largest number of recognized 
and unrecognized Rohingya refugees, 29,000 live in official 
camps, while another 200,000 live in makeshift settlements or 
amidst the local border population.20 Smaller populations reside 
in Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and India. October each year 
marks the start of the annual six-month sailing season, wherein 
Rohingyas flee persecution in Myanmar via smugglers on boats 
that are often unseaworthy.21
None of these countries fully respects the Rohingyas’ right 
to seek and enjoy asylum or the right to not be sent back to a 
country in which they have a well-founded fear of persecution 
on grounds of (among others) ethnicity or religion. Known as 
non-refoulement, this principle makes irrelevant the fact that the 
countries mentioned are not States Parties to the UN Convention 
on the Status of Refugees.22 The prohibition against involuntary 
return of asylum-seekers and refugees is a matter of customary 
international law, meaning that it applies regardless of a nation’s 
treaty status.
Instead, citing immigration concerns, economic incentives 
or constraints, or questionable claims of national security,23 all of 
these countries have resorted to detention, forced repatriation, the 
deprivation of basic necessities on the high seas, informal depor-
tation to traffickers, and/or direct participation in trafficking. 
The human rights and humanitarian records of Bangladesh and 
Thailand in particular have long been notably poor in relation to 
the Rohingya.24 As such, they are in breach of their international 
legal obligations pertaining to asylum-seekers and refugees.
Further, none of the countries directly affected by the 
Rohingyas’ displacement is a party to the Convention on the 
Status of Stateless Persons. While, as explained above, this 
Convention possibly acts against its own interests in Myanmar, 
it is notably appropriate to its regional neighbors.25 Unable to 
avail themselves of the diplomatic or consular protection of 
Myanmar, the Rohingyas’ stateless status places them in the 
same position everywhere, whereby their “right to have rights” 
is seen by the authorities as lacking. It simply compounds the 
precariousness of their situation.
Courtesy United Nations Development Programme
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Along with ending systemic discrimination in Myanmar, 
a solution to the Rohingya problem would be significantly 
advanced if Myanmar and its regional neighbors abided 
by the human rights provisions pertaining to stateless persons 
and refugees.
The ResponsibiliTy To pRoTecT
The doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect, agreed upon by 
the UN General Assembly in the 2005 World Summit Outcome 
Document, has three main pillars: 1) the state carries the primary 
responsibility for protecting populations from genocide, war 
crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, and their 
incitement; 2) the international community has a responsibility 
to encourage and assist states in fulfilling this responsibility; 
and 3) the international community has a 
responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, 
humanitarian and other means to protect 
populations from these crimes. If a state 
is manifestly failing to protect its popula-
tions, the international community must be 
prepared to take collective action to protect 
populations, in accordance with the Charter 
of the United Nations.26
This doctrine applies to the situation of 
the Rohingyas in Myanmar if one or more 
of the four expressed crimes is being or 
has been committed against them, and if 
Myanmar is “manifestly failing” to protect 
them.
As there is no armed conflict in Rakhine State, war crimes 
are clearly not at issue. Genocide, however, was claimed on doz-
ens of other occasions during the latter half of 2012, mostly by 
journalists, commentators, and Rohingya activists, but also by 
the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in November.27
International law defines genocide as acts “committed with 
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial 
or religious group.”28 Such acts are listed as killing members 
of the group, causing serious bodily or mental harm to members 
of the group, deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of 
life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole 
or in part, imposing measures intended to prevent births within 
the group, and forcibly transferring children of the group to 
another group.29
The most credible use of the term in relation to Myanmar 
came from Professor William Schabas, who from 2009-2011 
was a member of the International Association of Genocide 
Scholars. In an Al-Jazeera documentary entitled “The Hidden 
Genocide” that first aired on December 9, 2012, he stated:
[I]n the case of the Rohingya we’re moving into a zone 
where the word can be used. When you see measures 
preventing births, trying to deny the identity of a people,  
hoping to see that they really are eventually—that they 
no longer exist—denying their history, denying the 
legitimacy of their right to live where they live, these 
are all warning signs that mean that it’s not frivolous  
to envisage the use of the term genocide.30
Interestingly, Schabas is also the author of a 2010 report 
titled Crimes against Humanity in Western Burma: The Situation 
of the Rohingyas, in which he concluded that “[u]nder the 
circumstances, it does not seem useful at this stage to pursue 
an analysis that necessarily depends on an expansive approach 
to the definition of genocide.”31 He explained that international 
tribunals and other bodies have been unwilling to interpret the 
scope of genocide beyond “the intentional physical destruction 
of a group,”32 and so clearly implied that such intentional 
physical destruction of the Rohingya as a group was not taking 
place. While not ruling out the technical charge of genocide 
based on a “simplistic analysis of the factual findings” of the 
report, Schabas steered clear of assessing the Rohingya situation 
through the application of the genocide definition.33
Have the circumstances and factual 
findings since 2010 changed such that at 
this stage an argument would be persuasive 
that an intentional physical destruction of 
the Rohingya is underway in Myanmar? 
Schabas’s remarks on Al-Jazeera are essen-
tially consistent with his 2010 report, as 
most of what he notes is not necessarily 
aimed at physically destroying the Rohingya 
as a group, and even the communal violence 
of 2012 and the government’s response—
which he does not address—do not clearly 
implicate such an expansive definition 
of genocide.
Rather, what the Rohingya have exper-
ienced for decades recalls Schabas’s conclusion in 2010: crimes 
against humanity. A crime against humanity is defined in the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court as “any of the 
following acts when committed as part of a 1) widespread or 
systematic 2) attack directed against any 3) civilian population, 
4) with knowledge of the attack”.34 Schabas added that it is 
necessary that the perpetrator act pursuant to or in furtherance 
of a state or organizational policy.35
Among the eleven acts listed in the Rome Statute, nine are of 
varying relevance to the Rohingya in Myanmar: murder; forcible 
deportation or transfer of a population; imprisonment or other 
severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental 
rules of international law; torture; rape, enforced sterilization, 
or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity; 
persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on 
political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, or religious grounds; 
enforced disappearance of persons; the crime of apartheid; and 
other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing 
great suffering or serious injury.36
Schabas argued that “the Rohingya are the prima facie 
victims of the crime against humanity of persecution,”37 consisting 
of “the severe deprivation of fundamental rights on discrimina-
tory grounds.”38 The analysis is not dissimilar to discrimination 
discussed above, though placed squarely within the five elements 
that constitute a crime against humanity. Schabas also accurately 
asserted that the government of Myanmar has perpetrated the 
forcible transfer of the Rohingya population, via expulsion or 
other coercive acts.
If a state is manifestly 
failing to protect 
its populations, the 
international community 
must be prepared to take 
collective action to protect 
populations.
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He stopped short, however, of concluding that this crime 
against humanity also constitutes ethnic cleansing and it is 
here that his overall argument—accurate enough in 2010—is 
incomplete in view of the events of 2012. Ethnic cleansing is 
“rendering an area ethnically homogeneous by using force or 
intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area.”39 
It is distinct from genocide in its intent—to remove rather than 
destroy the group. Schabas stated: “Since at least 1978, the 
SPDC40 have persistently tampered with the ethnic make-up 
of the region. However, it cannot be said with any degree of cer-
tainty that the intent behind such actions is to ethnically cleanse 
North Arakan State.”41 This would no longer seem to be the case.
Action by ethnic Rakhine Buddhists and inaction by the 
authorities—both aided and abetted by years of persecutory 
policy and recent statements by officials—strongly suggest that 
what is being prosecuted in Rakhine State is an effort to remove 
the Rohingya from the area. President Thein Sein himself 
set the tone in July when he stated that the Rohingya could 
not and would not be accepted as either citizens or residents 
of Myanmar, and he asked the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) to consider placing them in camps outside 
of the country and resettling them to others.42 That is, he wanted 
them removed from Myanmar.
It is true that both he and other officials have moderated 
that position to some extent since.43 In August, the President 
pledged to open more schools for Rohingya.44 In September 
the Minister of Immigration stated that the Rohingya have 
the right to apply for citizenship,45 and the Vice President 
pointedly called for increased economic development for “both 
sides” in Rakhine State.46 In November the Foreign Minister 
pledged to return the displaced in Rakhine State to their homes 
as soon as possible.47 That month the President wrote a letter 
to the UN Secretary-General promising unspecified rights for 
the Rohingyas.48
Despite these words, however, the actions, developments, 
and facts on the ground still support the conclusion that ethnic 
cleansing49 is underway in Rakhine State. Proceeding chrono-
logically and merging relevant official actions and statements 
with those of relevant non-state actors,50 in August the Rakhine 
Nationalities Development Party’s (RNDP) Dr. Aye Maung 
reportedly urged rice sellers to refuse Rohingya buyers and said 
that Rakhine State should “be like Israel.”51 In a review of the 
situation prepared for Parliament that month, President Thein 
Sein reportedly stated that ethnic Rakhines were targeting and 
terrorizing the Rohingya population, and that Rakhines could 
not accept Rohingyas as citizens or residents of Myanmar.52 
In September, groups of monks in Mandalay demonstrated for 
several days urging the removal or internment of the Rohingya 
in Myanmar.53 The U.S. deputy national security advisor noted 
this problem and stated, “In Burma, preferential treatment 
for Buddhists and prejudice against ethnic South Asians, 
particularly ethnic Rohingya Muslims, fuels tensions between 
the Buddhist majority and Christian and Muslim minorities.”54
By mid-September, an estimated 76,000 persons in Rakhine 
State were living in camps. Most were Rohingyas, unable to 
work, go to school, buy goods either inside or outside the 
camps, or even leave them without fear of being beaten by ethnic 
Rakhines or detained by the authorities. Farther south, thousands 
of Rohingyas had fled the state capital of Sittwe, where their 
homes, shops, and mosques were destroyed like those of their 
compatriots elsewhere.55 According to Border Affairs Minister 
Lt. Gen. Thein Htay, the city reportedly consisted of “lines that 
cannot be crossed.”56 However, in what was described as their 
largest ever public gathering, ethnic Rakhines in Sittwe “laid 
out an ultra-nationalist manifesto approving, among other things 
. . . the formation of armed militias, . . . removal of Rohingya 
villages, and the reclamation of land that had been ‘lost’ to [the 
Rakhines].”57 They also came out against plans to reunite their 
community with the Rohingya.58
In October, a week before the second outbreak of violence 
on October 21, hundreds of ethnic Rakhines, including monks, 
demonstrated for several days in support of relocating the 
residents of the Aung Mingalar part of Sittwe, an almost entirely 
Muslim area.59 Human Rights Watch observed, “Segregation 
has become the status quo.”60 In the midst of the violence, 
several hundred Buddhists reportedly demonstrated in Sittwe in 
support of a ten-point document circulated by the All-Arakanese 
Monks’ Solidarity Conference, calling for the targeting of 
Rohingya sympathizers as national traitors, and the expulsion 
of Rohingyas from Myanmar.61 Most Rohingya neighborhoods, 
including unburned buildings, were bulldozed in the days fol-
lowing the violence.62 Further, as the government admitted that 
the violence against the Rohingya was instigated and organized, 
rather than spontaneous,63 the New York Times reported that 
anti-Islamic pamphlets appeared in Rakhine State.64
By November—when the number of displaced persons 
reached roughly 115,000 and consisted almost entirely of 
Rohingyas65—the situation was most accurately described by 
The Economist:
[I]ts main contours are clear: a vicious and bloody 
campaign of ethnic cleansing by) (the Rakhines that is 
intended to drive Rohingyas out. Rakhine politicians 
say frankly) (that the only alternative to mass deporta-
tion is a Burmese form of apartheid, in which more 
Rohingyas are corralled into squalid, semi-permanent 
internal-refugee camps.66
That month, Buddhist groups reportedly prevented doctors 
and aid workers from delivering medical assistance to camps of 
Rohingyas, and distributed pamphlets threatening them against 
continuing their work in Sittwe.67 Reuters reported that military 
sources said the second wave of attacks against the Rohingya 
—resulting in several more villages completely destroyed 
or cleansed—were planned and orchestrated by Rakhine nation-
alists tied to the RNDP (which denied official involvement).68 
Echoing the title of an August 2012 Human Rights Watch report 
produced after the initial violence (The Government Could 
Have Stopped This), a member of the National Democratic 
Party for Development, said “There were [threats of violence] 
ahead of the riots—we knew Kyaukphyu was going to burn and 
repeatedly warned concerned government authorities about it 
but they kept on saying ‘we got it’ and then the town was burnt 
down.”69 A government self-survey of ethnicity in Rakhine State 
did not contain the option of “Rohingya,” with those refusing 
to choose “Bengali” reportedly designated as such against their 
will or excluded altogether—in both cases potentially making 
them “illegal.”70
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December saw vehement official denials of the Al-Jazeera 
documentary’s conclusions, noted above, though the report’s 
findings were revealing. A Burmese academic stated that 
Rakhine State is “our ancestral land, we cannot share that land, 
you know, for any aliens or immigrants.”71 He also said that “no 
Muslim, no Bengali living in that town [of Taungoo] because 
the town people, town folk, do not allow any Bengali people 
to come here.”72 A Sittwe-based monk not only repeated this 
statement but reasoned it is why ethnic Rakhine Buddhists killed 
ten Muslims there in early June, setting off the initial communal 
violence: “They felt insulted and were furious when ten Muslims 
dared to pass through the town.”73 
Al-Jazeera displayed a July 2012 
statement by the RNDP’s Dr. 
Aye Maung that “Bengali people 
should be relocated to suitable 
places . . . in order not to reside 
or mix with Rakhines.”74 And it 
stated that in the Aung Mingalar 
section of Sittwe, the Rohingyas 
“are fenced in and cannot leave.”75
By the end of 2012, hundreds of 
Rohingya villages or settlements 
had been destroyed, tens of thou-
sands of homes razed, and at least 115,000 Rohingyas displaced 
in camps or “ghettos” in Myanmar, across the Bangladeshi border, 
or further afield on boats.76 According to the International Crisis 
Group, “There have been indications that the local authorities . 
. . might invoke colonial-era legislation that empowers them to 
reclaim areas damaged by fire as state-owned land.”77 Officials 
stated that the segregation was temporary for the safety of the 
Rohingyas and intended to prevent further violence, which was 
doubtless true in July when the process began. That organized 
violence had broken out again in October, however, and that the 
segregation had only increased, exposed the weakness of the 
statement in fact if not intent. Indeed, the most convincing indica-
tion that ethnic cleansing—the forcible removal—of the Rohingya 
in Rakhine State is underway is that so many have in fact been 
removed from their homes, neighborhoods, cities, and country.78
Certain lawmakers in Indonesia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and 
Japan referred to the situation in Rakhine State as ethnic cleansing 
in August and September. The Organization of Islamic 
Cooperation “expressed disappointment over the failure of the 
international community to take action,”79 and Saudi Arabia 
urged the “international community to take up its responsibili-
ties by providing needed protection.”80 The formal doctrine of 
the Responsibility to Protect, however, gained no appreciable 
traction among policy-makers.81
In November, the UN General Assembly (within which 
the Responsibility to Protect originated) adopted a resolution 
regarding Myanmar that expressed its “serious concern” about 
the situation in Rakhine State.82 It also called for government 
action in relation to “arbitrarily detained persons,” the “return 
of individuals to their original communities,” the “restitution of 
property,” and a “policy of integration . . . and peaceful coex-
istence.”83 Although the government “accepted” the General 
Assembly’s calls, it undermined its approval by protesting the 
use of the word “Rohingya” in the resolution.84
The General Assembly did not formally invoke the 
Responsibility to Protect. Possible reasons include that it did 
not judge the situation in Rakhine State to constitute crimes 
against humanity and/or ethnic 
cleansing that it deemed that 
Myanmar itself was exercising its 
primary responsibility to protect 
its citizens, or that it assessed that 
the notoriously difficult political 
hurdles attending the doctrine’s 
successful invocation made it 
a non-starter. Only the third 
possibility is valid: ethnic cleans-
ing is taking place in Myanmar, 
and as Myanmar is “manifestly 
failing to protect its populations, 
the international community must be prepared to take collective 
action to protect populations, in accordance with the Charter 
of the United Nations85….”
The Rohingya problem has been referred to and described in 
different ways, and certainly it is more than a matter of national-
ity and discrimination, statelessness and displacement, and the 
Responsibility to Protect. Yet the initial two areas have assumed 
particular factual and legal significance over the past three 
decades, as persecution of the Rohingya within Myanmar and its 
effects regionally have continued unabated. The third area—not 
unrelated to the others—should assume equal importance and 
attention, but thus far it has not. All three issues are progressive 
in their application to the Rohingya: persecutory discrimination 
and statelessness includes and leads to forcible displacement, 
which combined constitute crimes against humanity and ethnic 
cleansing and implicate the Responsibility to Protect.
Primary responsibility rests with the Myanmar government 
to protect those whose right to a nationality the country has long 
denied, but its regional neighbors have legal and humanitarian 
obligations of their own vis-à-vis the Rohingya, as does the inter-
national community. The Rohingya problem begins at home—and 
could well end there with enough political will. Failing that, as has 
been the case since June 2012 if not decades, regional countries 
and the wider world should act to address the displacement and 
statelessness, and to stop the violence and violations.
Primary responsibility rests with 
the Myanmar government to protect 
those whose right to a nationality 
the country has long denied, but its 
regional neighbors have legal and 
humanitarian obligations[.]
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